Counterinsurgency: The Civ-Mil Question

R. Scott Moore, Ph.D.

The Problem (at least to many)…

DOONESBURY "FLASHBACK"
By Garry Trudeau
SO, WHAT'VE YOU GOT FOR ME?
DRUG LORD. A MAJOR PLAYER.
HE'S CHALLENGING MY AUTHORITY HERE, BUT I CAN'T TOUCH HIM. HE HAS CONNECTIONS IN KABUL.
WHERE'S HE AT?
THAT GRAY HOUSE OVER THERE, JUST BEYOND THE MOSQUE.
BEEP! BEEP! BEEP!
WHOOM!
WHAT ELSE YOU GOT?
I DON'T GET IT — HOW COME YOU GUYS ARE LOSING?
UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE © 2009 G.B. Trudeau.
www.doonesbury.com

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied by this presentation do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the United States Government.

How Civilian Agencies See the Military

- “We are supposed to make decisions jointly. That’s the way it is on paper. That’s not the military concept.”
- “Sometimes there are people who frankly lack the competence to make a difference.” (about PRT commanders)
- “Every time a new commander comes in he’s got to have his fitness report and going to do a lot of things to drive the numbers.”
- ‘PRT’s do not have a sustained, continuous effort to build capacity.”
- “”For PRTs like us, we were wholly dependent on the military for security… the military has about zero flexibility to deviate from their template.”

UNCLASSIFIED

Are We on the Right Path?

- We continue to struggle both conceptually and practically with ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ tasks and responsibilities.
- Our military currently is perceived to be conducting “non-traditional missions”- but what does that mean?
- We are building civil agency capacities and creating ‘whole-of-government capabilities’- but to do what?
- We have a set of convictions about the ‘civilian’ dimensions of counterinsurgency, but are they accurate?

UNCLASSIFIED

nsurgency



Insurgency Outcomes

- Overthrow the government.
- Force the ruling government into a political accommodation.
- Insurgents are co-opted and marginalized.
- Insurgents defeated by the counterinsurgency.
- Most successful insurgencies ended with a settlement in which an occupying or intervening power withdrew; following which the insurgents resumed fighting and overthrew the government.
- Insurgencies that reached a measure of success lasted in excess of 8 years.

Insurgent Strategies…

- Exploited deep-seated and often intractable issues to gain legitimacy.
- Undermined the existing government through ideology and intimidation.
- Employed unconstrained, but purposeful, violence to create and sustain insecurity and instability.
- Conducted protracted paramilitary, political, economic, and social warfare to wear down the enemy.
- Controlled vital areas or denied them to the opposition to gain strength or weaken the opposition.

Typical Insurgency

Shattered Beliefs
- Fear and Uncertainty
- Mutual Hatreds
- Threatened identities
- Vulnerability
- Self-Preservation
- Radical Ideologies

Exploited by a Radical Group



Failed Structures
- Destroyed Infrastructure
- Minimal Governance
- Factionalism
- Lack of Basic Services
- Deprivation
- Weapons Proliferation
- Ineffective Security
- Warlords
- Criminal Gangs
- Opposition Groups

Violent Behaviors
- Random Violence
- Terrorism
- Revenge/ Retribution
- Looting
- Self-Defense
- Crime/ Corruption
- Population Movement
- Growing Opposition

Counterinsurg

When Counterinsurgency Succeeded…

- Two general strategic paths taken by those trying to establish peace.
  - Military defeat of the insurgency
  - Resolve underlying causes of the insurgency
- Strategies that primarily sought to defeat an enemy either failed or resulted in repression and occupation.
- Strategies that integrated political, social, economic, and security measures and addressed underlying causes and beliefs usually resulted in lasting (long-term) stability.
- Success required more than ten years of significant effort; the decisive point normally occurred about year 3 to 5.

Pattern of Violence



The Desired Counterinsurgency Endstate

Address the causes

Transformed Beliefs
- Legitimacy
- Tolerance
- Secure Identities
- Reconciliation

Legitimate Structures
- Stable Government
- Rule of Law
- Social Services
- Security Sector Reform Restored
- Infrastructure
- Resource Distribution

Sustaining Actions
- Minimal Violence
- Effective Law Enforcement
- Civil Obedience
- Arms Control
- Freedom of Movement
- Neutralized Extremists

UNCLASSIFIED

Are We on the Right Path?

- We continue to struggle both conceptually and practically with ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ tasks and responsibilities.
- Our military currently is perceived to be conducting “non-traditional missions”- but what does that mean?
- We are building civil agency capacities and creating ‘whole-of-government capabilities’- but to do what?
- We have a set of convictions about the ‘civilian’ dimensions of counterinsurgency, but are they accurate?

UNCLASSIFIED

The Civil-Military Dimension

The Philippines

- 1899-1902: US Army command
  - Military units performed all tasks
  - Military governors of provinces
  - War Department Bureau of Insular Affairs provided policy guidance
- 1902-1941: Civilian Administration
  - Civilian Governor General reported to Secretary of War
  - Army officers governed provinces in conflict
  - Civilians oversaw ‘pacified’ provinces
  - Civilian experts and private citizens developed basic services
  - Beginning in 1913, Philippines became self-governing

The 'Banana Wars'

- 1915-1934: Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua
  - US Ambassador provided policy guidance and overall command
  - Marines performed virtually all tasks
    - Marine brigade conducted COIN and security operations
    - Marine officers/NCOs seconded to Gendarme and civil services
- 1906-1921: Cuba
  - Army assumed control of Cuba; returned power to Cuban government
    - Restored order, reestablished governance
    - Army officers governed provinces for short periods and filled most government positions during transition
- Few civilians deployed
- "Host" government slowly returned to power

US "Small Wars"



Military Transition to Indigenous Authorities

Adapted from Conrad Crane, USMHI

European Imperial Policing

- British Colonial Model
  - Single Governor General commanded military and colonial service
    - British filled most senior administrative positions and officered security forces
    - British Army garrisons provided reserve in event of conflict, built infrastructure (railroads, communications)
    - Responses to uprisings largely punitive in nature
  - Colonial policy relied on co-opting local tribes and leaders
  - Much of British empire was self-governing
- French Colonial Model
  - Single Governor General commanded military and colonial service
    - French filled all administrative positions and officered security forces
    - French Colonial Army maintained internal security; fought uprisings
    - Responses to uprisings largely punitive in nature; however, tribal leaders often bought off
  - Little attempt to build indigenous capabilities
  - French empire was not self-governing

Imperial Policing



Military Transition to Civilian Administrators

Adapted from Conrad Crane, USAMHI

US Military Governance

- Military assumed full responsibility for occupied and liberated territories
- Specially trained units planned for and deployed specifically to conduct civil operations
  - Relieved combat units of civil affairs tasks
  - Task organized to conduct operations
- Transitioned to local authorities
- Army and Navy carried out post-war occupations
  - Civilians provided expertise, but did not provide robust capabilities

Post-Colonial Counterinsurgency

- Malaya
  - Single High Commissioner commanded civil-military efforts
  - British were the government
    - All security forces under British command
    - Political structures led by British authorities
    - Indigenous forces and capabilities adjuncts to British
  - Goal- Restore British authority, then transition to indigenous authorities
- Vietnam
  - No single strategic authority
    - Invariably operated through a “host” government
    - Did not control indigenous security forces or political structures
    - Ambassador nominally in control, but military commanders operated within military hierarchy
  - Goal- Restore “host” nation authority and reform it in the process

Cold War

- USSR in Eastern Europe
  - Poland (1953), Hungary (1956). and Czechoslovakia (1968)
  - The military used to crush unrest and rebellion
  - Opposition eliminated and Communist Party reinforced

- US and UK Interventions
  - Lebanon (1958); Jordan (1958); Laos (1962); DomRep (1965); Grenada (1983)
  - Rapid operation to restore order and reestablish friendly government
  - Prevent Communist incursions

Post- Cold War

- Peacekeeping: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo
  - Military ends violence and establishes security
  - Civil tasks carried out by international organizations
  - Long-term security provided by follow-on forces (UN)
- Iraq and Afghanistan
  - Military sets stable conditions for civilian agencies
  - Reality on the ground tends to create a grey area
  - Military assumes civilian tasks
  - USG continues to grapple with an institutional solution

Af-Pak Strategy Requirements for Success

USG mission:

- Full Support to Civilian increase of 421 by December 2009
- Increased resources for military support to the civilian increase including security, mobility, logistics, and engineering, civil affairs partners
- Increase in the FY10 budget for Afghanistan civilian programs and operations
- Move to 5-year budgets as with Iraq and Pakistan model

Regional Partnership:

- Increased Af-Pak coordination in finance, border management, trade, agriculture, law enforcement and intelligence
- Regional action on power, water, transport and trade

Prevailing Concept



Military Transitions to US/ International Civil Authority

Current Presumptions

- Complex operations require civilian capacities, with the military in support.
- The transition is from military forces to international civil agencies.
- Once the security situation allows, military forces withdraw, retaining only a limited security and training capability.
- Civil agencies transition governance and development to indigenous institutions as they become capable of assuming them.

Given Past and Current Operations, Are These Va

US Historical Experience

- Military forces conducted the full spectrum of counterinsurgency tasks; advised and supported by civil agencies and expertise.
- The transition was from military forces to indigenous institutions, not to US or other civil agencies.
- Civil agencies provided policy guidance and expertise, first to military forces, then to indigenous institutions.
- The US rarely fielded a robust civil capability for administering or governing other states or regions; and likely will not for many years, if at all.
- The US rejected establishing a large civilian presence; it smacked of imperialism.

US Traditional Concept



Military Transition to Indigenous Authorities

Adapted from Conrad Crane, USMHI

The Civ-Mil Dilemma

- Military and civil tasks cannot be separated; the military usually assumes de facto responsibility for them all, especially in conflict and post-conflict situations
- US civil agencies have not “traditionally” carried out the civil tasks; they provided policy guidance and expertise.
- Security concerns and scope of effort precluded large-scale civilian presence.
- US anti-colonial tradition prohibited development of civilian capacity to govern other countries.
- ‘Interagency’ provided guidance, advice, and some funding, but they have not replaced military forces.

The question is not one of roles and missions, it is one of transition. This fundamental strategic and conceptual question has not been addressed.

Insurgency "Success"

- Ireland 1916-1922
- China 1927-1949
- Palestine 1945-1947
- Indonesia 1945-1949
- Indochina 1946-1954
- Algeria 1954-1962
- Cuba 1956-1959
- Angola 1961-1975
- Guinea 1962-1974
- Vietnam 1962-1975
- Mozambique 1964-1975
- Cambodia 1970-1975
- Nicaragua 1978-1979
- Afghanistan 1979-1989

Counterinsurgency Successes

- Haiti 1915-1934
- DomRep 1916-1924
- Morrocco 1921-1926*
- Iraq 1922-1932*
- Nicaragua 1926-1933*
- Palestine 1936-1939*
- Greece 1944-1949
- Lithuania 1945-1950*
- Philippines 1947-1954
- Colombia 1948-1958*
- Malaya 1948-1957
- Kenya 1952-1960
- Brunei 1962-1966
- Yemen 1962-1970*
- Uruguay 1963-1972*
- Guatemala 1966-1984*
- Thailand 1967-1983
- Dhofar 1970-1976
- Philippines 1972-1996
- Argentina 1976-1980*
- El Salvador 1979-1992
- Nicaragua 1981-1988
- Peru 1982-1997

* Resulted in enforced stability

Reestablishing Government Control

- Lansdale in the 1950s
  - HUK Rebellion (Philippines) and Vietnam
  - The military as a civil development force, not only a security force
  - Secure- reestablish government services- transition to government
- Pacification in Vietnam
  - CORDS- civil operations under military command
  - CAP and Civil Affairs- civil operation conducted by the military
  - Competing priorities- attacking the enemy or building civil society (CORDS and Phoenix)

USG Action Plan for Afghanistan: Transformative Effects

COIN Transformative Effects critical to achieving USG strategy in Afghanistan.

Security
Governance
Development
Information
• Elections and Continuity of Governance
• Expansion of Accountable and Transparent Governance
• Access to Justice
• Community and Government-led Reconciliation
• Population Security
• Action Against Irreconcilables
• Countering the nexus of narcotics, corruption, insurgency, and criminality
• Cross-Border Access for Commerce not Insurgents
• Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access
• Creating Economic Options for Major Population Centers
• Claim the Information Initiative
Enabling Conditions:
• International Support
• Regional Cooperati